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Abstract 
What does a commitment to relationality require of practices of knowledge- and world-
making? By providing a constructive criticism of Karen Barad’s general assertion that 
‘relata do not preexist relations’, in this paper I explore the ethical and methodological 
implications and demands of relational forms of thought and knowledge in relation to 
enduring creatures, or what Alfred North Whitehead calls ‘societies’.  I argue that instead 
of treating relationality as a matter of general principles and assertions, we should 
approach it technically and carefully, as a question to which each practice has to find its 
own mode of response, for which each practice has to learn how to become responsible. 
In other words, this involves attending not only to different, situated processes of 




[BLOCK QUOTE] “Invent some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also 
satisfy alien demands – that and that only is the path to peace!” William James (205) 
 
Introduction: By what are we obligated? 
 
Wandering seemingly aimlessly through the streets of Paris, Oliveira, the main character 
of Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch (1966), suddenly comes across a crowd gathered around 
what looks like a traffic accident. “OPINION had it”, the narrator reports:  
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[BLOCKQUOTE] that the old man had slipped, that the car had run the red light, that the 
old man had tried to commit suicide, that the things were getting worse than ever in Paris, 
that traffic was terrible, that is was not the old man’s fault, that it was the old man’s fault, 
that the brakes on the car were not working right, that the old man had been frightfully 
careless, that living was getting more expensive every day, that there were too many 
foreigners in Paris who didn’t understand the traffic laws and were taking work away 
from the Frenchmen. (97) [END BLOCKQUOTE] 
 
Even though the old man “didn’t seem to be hurt too badly”, a moment later an 
ambulance arrived and the man was put on a stretcher. The driver of the car kept 
gesticulating and explaining his version of the accident to the police and the onlookers. In 
mobilizing physics, engineering, law, environmentalism, psychology, economics, and 
racism, a version, or rather, multiple versions of the event were being constructed. The 
old man had been put on a stretcher. Nobody seemed to care for what he had to say.  
  
The circle of witnesses dissolved after “[a] few drops of rain began to fall” (98) and 
Oliveira resumed his wandering. This encounter, however, forced him to think: 
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] “A complete lack of communication”, Oliveira thought. “It’s not so 
much that we’re alone, that’s a well-known fact that any fool can plainly see. Being alone 
is basically being alone on a certain level in which other lonelinesses could communicate 
with us if that were the case. But bring on a conflict, an accident in the street or a 
declaration of war, provoke the brutal crossing of different levels, and a man who is 
perhaps an outstanding Sanskrit scholar or a quantum physicist becomes a pépère 
[grandpa] in the eyes of the stretcher-bearer who arrives on the scene. Edgar Allan Poe on 
a stretcher, Verlaine in the hands of a sawbones, Nerval and Artaud facing psychiatrists. 
What could that Italian Galen have known about Keats as he bled him and helped him die 
of hunger? If men like them are silent, as is most likely, the others will triumph blindly, 
without evil intent, of course, without knowing that the consumptive over there, that 
injured man lying naked on that bed, are doubly alone, surrounded by beings who move 
about as if behind a glass, from a different place in time…”. (98) [END BLOCKQUOTE] 




Knowledge, ethics, relations, and worldly encounters are all present in this problematic 
scene that troubles Oliveira while he continues wandering in the rain. As he wanders, and 
wonders about the event, the face of the old man, “which could almost be described as 
placid, perplexed maybe” (98), presents itself as an obligation that Oliveira feels 
compelled to respond to, if one wants to know what happened to him, and what in turn 
has happened to us, in a way that takes seriously the patterns of relevance that compose 
the situation and does not thereby contribute to the production of a double loneliness that 
only forces the world to disjoin itself, locating us, onlookers, as if behind a glass 
(Savransky, Adventure). The scene in this case concerns humans – and not only humans, 
but also other non-human bodies, cars, streets, knowledge, love, hate – but the concern 
could never be read as exclusively humanist: what Oliveira wonders about is precisely the 
role of human encounters in an “ethics of worlding” (Barad, Meeting 392). 
 
I find that these meditations resonate profoundly with what I take to be one of the most 
laudable and promising aspects of Karen Barad’s work, namely, her commitment to a 
posthumanist ethico-onto-epistemology that refuses to separate questions of knowing 
from questions of being, and therefore makes perceptible the way in which such 
entanglements always already situate us in the realm of ethics, and interrogates our 
‘response-ability’ (Haraway 2008) for “the differential patterns of mattering of the world 
of which we are a part” (Barad, Meeting 394).  
 
In this paper, thus, my aim is to attempt to think with Barad, Cortázar, Alfred North 
Whitehead, and others about what an ethics of worlding may demand of us whenever 
knowledge-making, which is also to say, world-making, is at stake (Savransky, “Worlds 
in the Making”), and more specifically, when those processes of knowing can be said to 
concern, as in Oliveira’s scene, encounters with humans as well as other entities endowed 
with higher levels of organizational complexity (Whitehead, Modes of Thought). To be 
sure, this is not to be confounded with a nostalgic cry for a form of rejuvenated 
humanism. In contrast, I regard such concern as emerging precisely out of what we may 
call a ‘posthumanist’ spirit, whenever that term stands not for a fascination with non-
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humans (as if they were the new anthropological – perhaps post-anthropological? – 
other), but for a non-bifurcated cosmology that forces us to rethink the very relationship 
between the Anthropos and the Oïkos in such a way that things are placed “all around and 
us with them like parasites” (Serres 33). 
 
As I will argue below, the challenge of engaging in an ethics of worlding, which is to say, 
of becoming able to respond to this buzzing and dynamic world whereby humans and 
non-humans are already meshed together in processes of inter- and intra-acting, as Barad 
would call them, requires both that we account for their entanglements and fuzzy 
boundaries and that we become able to deal with the question of how the actual world 
obligates us, of what its many existents, in their own different ways, demand of us as 
partakers in their – and our – worldly becomings. To do this, I will argue that while we 
must resist bifurcating worldly beings into clear-cut ontological distinctions and of 
conceiving of things as enjoying an isolated existence, we nevertheless need to be able to 
account for their differential, specific, and relatively separate modes of existence, and 
thus, for the heterogeneous obligations that these pose as ‘stubborn facts’ in the many 
encounters in which we all enter and through which they, us, and of course, the world, are 
brought into forms of problematic (co-)existence (Whitehead, Process and Reality). This, 
I will show, might allow us to conceive of knowledge-practices not just as ‘performative’ 
but as risky, ethical processes of mattering.  
 
From Quanta to Societies: Intra-action, Endurance and the Danger of Relationalism 
 
Let us now go back, like little detectives, to the scene of the accident. As the narrator 
presents it, we enter the phenomenal scene with Oliveira as elements in the midst of its 
own intra-active process of materialization. As Barad argues in her Meeting the Universe 
Halfway: 
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] the primary ontological unit is not independent objects with inherent 
boundaries and properties but rather phenomena. […] phenomena do not merely mark the 
epistemological inseparability of observer and observed, or the results of measurements; 
Author’s Proof.  
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rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability/entanglement of intra-acting 
“agencies”. (139; emphasis in original) [END BLOCKQUOTE] 
 
According to what we may call, with Barad, an agential-realist reading of this scene, 
objects, humans, and material signs, the car, the old man, and the onlookers, are being 
intra-actively enacted through the different ‘agential cuts’ performed by the various 
cultural and medical material-semiotic practices involved and by the varying opinions 
and versions such processes afford. Was it really an accident? Or a suicide attempt? 
Perhaps, an act of recklessness by an ignorant ‘foreigner’? Who’s responsible for what? 
Boundaries remain provisionally indeterminate, as does knowledge. Suddenly, a few 
drops of rain diffract all the not-yet-fully-constituted elements in novel, unexpected ways. 
Our own co-witness, Oliveira, sets off into a walking meditation that induces further 
diffractions that summon Poe, Verlaine, Keats, Artaud, and others to bear themselves 
witness to and further intra-act with the ‘phenomenon’, thereby prompting a meditation 
on the perils of communication and, as I have argued above, on the relevance of 
obligations. 
 
However, something haunts the becoming of the phenomenon of which Oliveira but also 
we, as readers, are a part; something that puts the very dictum that “relata do not preexist 
relations” (Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity” 815; Meeting 140) at risk. Namely, 
what haunts the becoming of the phenomenon is the fact that the process seems to 
‘triumph blindly’, ignoring the old man’s experience altogether. Indeed, by reducing him 
to a pépère, his stubborn existence dims to the point of becoming a mere effect of the 
many versions that enact him in multiple ways. This is not to say that, ‘actually’, the old 
man before the phenomenon and the one emerging from it could or should be conceived 
of as identical, that is, as capable of fully preserving ‘him-self’ in a way that is unaffected 
by the phenomenon. Surely he is transformed through it, as are the car, the onlookers, the 
traffic; as are Oliveira, Cortázar, and as are we. What Cortázar’s account makes present, 
however, is that the various storied patterns through which the phenomenon is accounted 
for fail to inherit the very experience of the old man as a constraint on the becoming of 
the phenomenon itself.  
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But how could the old man’s experience, which cannot be dissociated from his past, be of 
any relevance to the phenomenon if the old man as one of the many relata is, according to 
Barad’s proposition, an emergent element of the phenomenon itself? Indeed, if relata do 
not preexist their relations, as Barad has put it, if they come into existence through their 
relations, should we not conclude in this case that the old man is indeed nothing other 
than a pépère? Should we not affirm that the old man only is in and through these 
relations that constitute him as a pépère such that he cannot exist, sensu stricto, before, 
after, or aside from this situation? My aim here is to attempt to provide a possible way of 
resisting such a conclusion and to risk taking Oliveira’s wandering concerns seriously, by 
encountering the old man as a speculative presence that forces us to think. 
 
In this sense, Levi Bryant has rightly pointed out the problematic character of Barad’s 
thesis that relata do not preexist relations, for it forces us to affirm that relations always 
precede entities or ‘relata’ such that the latter not only emerge through them but can have 
no subsistence or being apart from those relations through which they emerge. To be 
sure, the point is not to discuss whether there is such a thing as ‘the old man’ existing 
independently of any relations – of course there isn’t, as his very name suggests – and 
neither is it to pose the question of whether relations matter – of course they do. 
 
The question, rather, is how, in the configuring of a specific situation, both relations and 
relata come to matter and affect each other. That is, whether there is any way in which an 
entity might be said to enter into new relations – and hence to have a relative pre-
existence with respect to them – whether it might be capable of being affected by such 
novel encounters without becoming an entirely other entity; whether such an entity can, 
in Whitehead’s (Adventures of Ideas) words, endure. If this latter question is answered in 
the affirmative, that is, if we are able to affirm that an entity, human or not, may be 
capable of enduring and thus of partaking in multiple phenomena, another question 
makes itself felt, one which, as I will argue, has major ethical importance. Namely, the 
question of the extent to which an enduring entity may be capable of posing its own 
obligations, that is, of constraining – in the sense of both limiting and enabling (e.g. 
Author’s Proof.  
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Gomart) – the manner in which a situation – such as it may be instituted by a research 
situation, for example – might inherit it; its capacity to institute itself as a demand for a 
situation to “tak[e] responsibility for that which [it] inherit[s]” and for how it does so 
(Barad, “Quantum Entanglements” 264).  
 
I very much agree with Bryant that the consequences of the proposition that the intra-
active processes of relating bring their own relata into being might be rather 
“catastroph[ic] for […] empirical investigation, and concrete practice”. But from my 
point of view, no less problematic is the postulation of a ‘minimal ontological autonomy’, 
a notion of a thing-in-itself, existing in isolation, that reintroduces a conception of the 
“undifferentiated endurance” (Whitehead, Process and Reality 77) of independent 
substances to which relations merely ‘happen’.  
  
Indeed, the consequences of the latter proposition involve a revival of the same bifurcated 
ontology of primary and secondary qualities that “dominates language, and haunts both 
science and philosophy”, that has “formed the basis of scientific materialism” 
(Whitehead, Process and Reality 78), and which we have sought out to resist.  
  
In contrast, I would argue that what we may call ‘the danger of relationalism’, that is, the 
danger of negating the historical – hence relative and contingent – preexistence of entities 
to specific relational entanglements, does not necessarily reveal the inadequacy of 
Barad’s proposal of relational thinking as such. We should not fall into the paradoxical 
trap of placing the concept of relationality at arm’s length, but we do need to treat the 
concept carefully, resisting levelling it to an all-too-general proposition to which nothing 
can resist. Relationality, I want to suggest, needs to be treated technically, that is, with the 
care that one devotes to the development of a technique. A care that requires that we pay 
attention to the local, situated, and specific manners in which concepts, as technical tools, 
may indeed be productive, while refraining from extending them into all-encompassing 
‘worldviews’. As Whitehead has taught us, no mode of thinking can be dissociated from 
the mode of existence of the entities to which it relates (Whitehead Science and the 
Modern World, Process and Reality; see also Stengers, “Beyond Conversation”, 
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“Constructivist Reading”, Thinking with Whitehead). Thus, the task is that of sensing the 
limits of the domain for which such a mode is capable of becoming a lure for feeling, of 
pointing towards what matters, and the domains for which, if it is extended unlimitedly, a 
concept may engender the danger of making us prisoners of the false problems it creates.  
  
I understand that Barad’s ‘battle’, the problem that seems to traverse and animate her 
work, is precisely that of reclaiming, against the pervading character of Cartesian 
assumptions of a discrete subject/object split and the “metaphysics of individualism” 
(Meeting 393) that postulates a world populated by entities in isolation from each other, 
the dynamic relationalities and entanglements through which we and the world come into 
existence. And, as many of us writing today and engaging with this and other works, I 
seek to partake in that battle. But, as I hope to show, the particular requirements of the 
practices I am concerned with prompt me to wonder about and care for how such a battle 
might be carried forward in productive ways. 
 
In other words, while Barad’s proposition, which she inherits from the quantum physics 
of Niels Bohr, may be relevant to the domain of quantum phenomena that both of them 
discuss, I worry that making ‘intra-action’ a mot d’ordre that affirms that “the world is 
intra-activity in its differential mattering” (Barad, Meeting 141) risks becoming 
counterproductive. My argument is thus not that the notion of ‘intra-action’ is per se ill-
conceived, but that extending the scope of ‘intra-active’ processes to the point where they 
are made to account for the adventures of any enduring entity might entail rather 
detrimental epistemological, ontological, and ethical consequences. The result might not 
in the end lead to the creation of new contrasts, out of which new habits of attention 
emerge, but to the rehearsal of a habit of finding in the specific differences and 
obligations that enduring entities pose, the same relationalities and entanglements that 
constitute them, everywhere and always. 
 
Surely, Barad recognizes this danger, and she claims that, in her work, “[e]ntanglements 
are not a name for the interconnectedness of all being as one, but rather specific material 
relations of the ongoing differentiating of the world” (“Quantum Entanglements” 265). 
Author’s Proof.  
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This claim is partially reassuring, but the reference to “the world” here remains somewhat 
disconcerting as its overarching generality stops us precisely from becoming sensitive to 
the specific contrasts introduced by those differentiating creatures that are a part of the 
world’s ongoing process. They are a part, that is, in the sense both of coming into 
existence out of the world’s creative advance, and of productively constraining the 
directions this process might take as it comes to terms with the stubborn fact of their 
existence. Thus, my sense is that to resist this danger we require words that may allow us 
to affirm, simultaneously, the relational processes by which the different creatures of this 
world come into existence as well as the radical irreducibility of the stubborn fact of their 
existence.  
 
To be sure, this is not a return to the isolationist, discrete, individualist metaphysics that 
would hold that enduring entities such as rocks, plants, animals, or humans are 
ontologically distinct, and that in order to attend to differences, we should resort to a 
classical language of ‘types’ or ‘kinds’ of beings (cf. Hacking, “Making Up People”, 
Social Construction). Indeed, following Brian Henning, “if the last century’s 
revolutionary discoveries in quantum physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, and 
ecology have taught us anything, we must acknowledge that there are no absolute 
divisions in nature” (68). And obviously, neither is it a return to the dream of a reality 
that can be known – that should be known – independently of any practice, that is, of any 
relation. 
 
What is at stake, I think, is that even though, as Barad argues, we should not confine the 
potential lessons of Bohr’s quantum mechanics to some ‘microscopic’ scale beyond 
which Newtonian (meta)physics may prevail unchallenged, we also should not be too 
quick to reduce the requirements of other practices to the lessons of supposedly “more 
fundamental issues of principle” (Meeting 110). We must honor Bohr’s lessons, but not 
as something that the entire world must comply with as a matter of principle. Rather, if an 
attention to relationality is such a lesson, we must take the risk of extending it, of 
proposing it, as a question to which each practice has to find its own mode of response, 
for which each practice has to learn how to become responsible.  
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In this way, I think that in order to resist the danger of what we may, for lack of a better 
term, call a ‘relational reductionism’, we need to find ways affirming relationality while 
foregrounding and exploring the intricate textures and forms of something Barad 
recognizes but which, I fear, is in danger of being overshadowed by her radically 
relational proposition, namely, what she calls “agential separability” (Meeting 176) – the 
ways in which the world creates enduring patterns of difference by dynamically enfolding 
and unfolding itself – differences that matter, and that do so enormously, not least for the 
possibilities of worldly refoldings that such enduring forms dynamically contribute to 
configuring. To put it differently, I want to affirm relationality while experimenting with 
what Gilles Deleuze would associate with a mannerism. That is, an account that does not 
introduce ontological gaps in the fabric of the universe nor reduce enduring entities to the 
relations that constitute them, but instead seeks to become sensitive to the different modes 
of mattering of the many creatures that populate, and hence compose, the world.  
 
It is with this aim in mind that I want to turn to Whitehead’s contrast between what he 
calls an “actual entity” or “actual occasion” – i.e the basic unity of reality – and his 
account of any enduring entity as already constituting a “society of actual occasions” 
(Process and Reality, Adventures of Ideas). Because it is in this contrast that I see the 
possibility of multiplying the planes of reality, the practices and modes of existence that 
compose it, and of posing the question of the specific ways in these may come to invent 
responses to the question of relationality. 
   
Not unlike quanta in Bohr and Barad, for Whitehead all actual occasions are their 
relations,1 that is, they come into existence by internally prehending the actual world as a 
datum into their own self-realisation so that “every actual entity is present in other actual 
entities” (Whitehead, Process and Reality 50; emphasis in original). Thus, like quantum 
leaps (Barad, “Quantum Entanglements”), the becoming of an actual entity is not a 
process that can be characterized by temporal continuity – there is a “becoming of 
continuity but no continuity of becoming” (Whitehead, Process and Reality 35). Thus, an 
actual occasion “has no […] history. It never changes. It only becomes and perishes.” 
Author’s Proof.  
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(Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas 204). It occasions reality, and as such it makes time 
rather than being contained by it.  
 
Yet actual entities are not in any sense what we may refer to as the ‘empirical objects’ of 
most specialized sciences, certainly not those of the social sciences, insofar as the latter 
may be concerned with entities endowed with higher levels of organizational complexity 
and to the extent that the experience of the old man may be included among their matters 
of concern. Surely, a minimal requirement of the social sciences is that the entities to 
whom they pose questions endure. And interestingly, for Whitehead, enduring entities are 
always societies of actual entities. As he puts it, “[a]n ordinary physical object, which has 
temporal endurance, is a society” (Process and Reality 35). Thus, societies are specific 
modes of grouping of actual entities under some kind of ‘social order’ – how such a 
manner of grouping is formed constitutes what a society is.  
  
The contrast between an actual entity and a society is important, moreover, because while 
the latter is to be conceived of as a grouping of actual entities, it cannot be reduced to a 
secondary order, to a mere epiphenomenon of some supposedly primary, ‘really real’ 
process in which actual entities are involved. To be clear, societies are not grouped 
together just because they happen to have common characteristics, and their contrast with 
actual entities is not simply a matter of scale, or of mere quantity, but of organizational 
complexity – of modes of existence. According to Whitehead, a society “is its own 
reason”, which is to say that its members are related not merely by similarity but “by 
reason of genetic derivation from other members of that same society” (Adventures of 
Ideas 203-204). They are metaphysical existents. Crucially, however, unlike an actual 
entity, a society, formed through the mode of such genetic derivation, “enjoys a history 
expressing its changing reactions to changing circumstances” (Adventures of Ideas 204; 
my emphasis): 
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] [i]t is evident from [the] description of the notion of a ‘Society’, as 
here employed, that a set of mutually contemporary occasions cannot form a complete 
society. For the genetic condition cannot be satisfied by such a set of contemporaries. Of 
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course, a set of contemporaries may belong to a society. But the society, as such, must 
involve antecedents and subsequents. In other words, a society must exhibit the peculiar 
quality of endurance. The real actual things that endure are all societies. They are not 
actual occasions. (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas 204) [END BLOCKQUOTE] 
 
Furthermore, because what a society is, is the manner in which it is formed, societies can 
vary in terms of the mode of social order they enjoy. What distinguishes the mode of 
existence of a society from another is not an ontological gap that would separate the 
many beings of this world into discrete kinds or types thereby bifurcating the world itself. 
In contrast, different modes of existence emerge from the different modes of social 
organization in such a way that the many modes build upon and “shade off into each 
other”:  
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] [t]here is the animal life with its central direction of a society of cells, 
there is the vegetable life with its organized republic of cells, there is the cell life with its 
organized republic of molecules, there is the large-scale inorganic society of molecules 
with its passive acceptance of necessity derived from spatial relations, there is the infra- 
molecular activity which has lost all trace of the passivity of inorganic nature on a larger 
scale. (Whitehead, Modes of Thought 157) [END BLOCKQUOTE] 
 
In other words, if “‘Humans’ are emergent phenomena like all other physical systems” 
(Barad, Meeting 338), they are not for that reason just like all other physical systems. 
Needless to say, my point here is not to reserve a special place for humans in the fabric of 
the world, but to introduce words that may allow us to pay attention to how the 
differences between humans, dogs, orchids, wasps, rocks, atoms, and so forth matter for 
how we come to think about relationality, and indeed, for how we come to inhabit 
relations that in turn inhabit us.  
 
In this way, if the old man can be said to be a society of actual entities that is capable of 
having adventures, that is, of having its members connected by a nexus that is indeed 
continuous in both space and time (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas 202), then he cannot 
Author’s Proof.  
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be reduced to the intra-active relationalities through which it may nevertheless be 
composed. Insofar as he is transformed by his participation in it, the phenomenon is also 
affected by the incorporation of the old man’s experience as a stubborn fact in its own 
becoming. As Whitehead puts it in his Adventures of Ideas:  
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] it must be remembered that just as the relations modify the natures of 
the relata, so the relata modify the nature of the relation. The relationship is not a 
universal. It is a concrete fact with the same concreteness as the relata. (157) [END 
BLOCKQUOTE] 
  
This, it seems to me, is the crux of the matter: that insofar as relations are as real as the 
different entities they bring into existence, they are not, sensu stricto, prior or primary 
with respect to the latter, but are as concrete as everything else, contributing, in specific 
and diverse manners, to the modes of mattering of societies, just as these configure the 
modes of mattering of relations. It’s not just, then, that the world is relational, that 
relationality is original whereas societies are derivative, or that “[r]elations do not follow 
relata, but the other way around” (Barad, Meeting 136-37). Rather, to resist the danger of 
relational reductionism, I suggest we must come to terms with a world made, 
dynamically, of the shifting modes of mattering of societies-and-relations all the way 
down, all the way back. Paying close attention to those modes or manners, and to their 
dynamic natures, becomes, thus, the task of an ethics concerned not with the stasis 
implied in the all-too-general, abstract distinctions between good and evil, but with the 
fragile and dynamic problem of co-existence of the many modes of mattering that 
compose the world in its becoming.  
 
It is such an attention that I see present in the scene with which I opened this article. 
Indeed, what concerns Oliveira is not just the exclusionary effect of a performative; he is 
not just asking for accountability to the particular ways in which the coming-into-
existence of the phenomenon’s components are enacted in this way and not another 
(Barad, Meeting 284). What prompts his meditations is the failure of a socio-material 
process to make the experience of the old man matter, that is, the failure to inherit his 
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experience not as what would or should single-handedly determine the becoming of the 
phenomenon and perform a once-and-for-all determinate cut, but as a stubborn fact that is 
to “be implicated in that [process] in one or other of many modes, [as] a conditioned 
indetermination” (Whitehead, Process and Reality 23).  
 
Thus, if as Barad argues, “we are responsible for the world of which we are a part […] 
because reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping 
and through which we are shaped” (Meeting 390), the challenge of becoming response-
able to the becoming of such a phenomenon is also that of affirming the adventure of the 
old man as a society capable of enduring. In turn, such affirmation demands that we pay 
due attention to the potential obligations that the old man himself may pose to the mode 
of mattering of the relations through which the situation is configured, of how his own 
mode of mattering and experiencing may constrain its possible practical materializations. 
Ultimately, each practice must invent a manner of responding to the modes of mattering 
with which it is involved in a way that allows for the crafting of new contrasts, that is, of 
novelty and new habits of attention. It is through this risky, inventive process of 
inheritance and creativity, I argue, that we may avoid producing a ‘double loneliness’ that 
disjoins the world and its many inhabitants and may instead contribute to assembling 
forms of problematic togetherness that show a ‘concern’ for the becoming of the world 
(see also Bell). 
 
Oliveira’s meditations complexify our way of conceiving of and experiencing the 
challenge of an ethics of worlding. By demanding not only that one accounts for the 
particular worlds practices bring into being but also that one pays attention to the modes 
of mattering of the many experiences to which such practices must invent a way of 
responding, Oliveira’s ethical speculations establish the possibility of an ethics of 
worlding as a radically demanding challenge. A challenge that I, in turn, am interested in 
experimenting with in relation to certain scientific practices that may be said to engage 
and seek to account for experiences not unlike the old man’s. Thus, with Oliveira, I will 
argue that the speculative challenge that an ethics of worlding poses to such practices 
relates to the careful fabrication of “delicate contacts, marvelous adjustments with the 
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world” (Cortázar 99; my emphasis). As will be shown below, such delicate contacts and 
marvelous adjustments require that we affirm both entities and relations, for they “could 
not be attained from just one point; the outstretched hand ha[s] to find response in another 
hand stretched out from the beyond, from the other part.” (Cortázar 99; my emphasis).  
 
Delicate Contacts, Marvelous Adjustments: Scientific Practices, Worldly Encounters and 
Modes of Mattering 
 
If knowing can be characterized as “a specific engagement of the world where part of the 
world becomes intelligible to another part of the world” (Barad, Meeting 342), then we 
must attend to the mode of mattering of the entities that a process of knowing comes to 
inherit in different ways. Doing so, moreover, makes perceptible the extent to which the 
coming-into-existence of new and transformed beings and thus, of novel worldly 
configurations, cannot be legislated in advance, but should be regarded as an 
achievement. In turn, such achievements can never be dissociated from the obligations 
the existents encountered may pose – or fail to pose – to the practices with which they 
become entangled. Whenever what is at stake is a process of engaging with enduring 
entities in such a way that something called ‘knowledge’ may emerge as its aim, the 
process may create itself, but it does not create the entities with which it must learn to 
come to terms. In other words, because it is a question of a dynamic coming to terms and 
not just of a performativity that creates that which it purports to discover, mattering 
always entails taking risks. Thus, in order to entertain the challenge of an ethics of 
worlding, we need to attend to the specific manners of creating delicate contacts between 
the mode of mattering of an entity and the mode of invention of a practice, so that the 
obligations posed by the former may be inherited in a way that forces the practice to 
invent a way of becoming responsible for it.  
 
In this sense, as Andrew Pickering, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, and Isabelle Stengers 
(Invention) have argued in different ways, the event of an experimental achievement in 
the sciences of the laboratory does not belong, pace epistemologists, to a pre-established 
‘right to know’ with which a scientist might approach her object, a guarantee provided by 
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the promises of method and rationality, and neither can such an achievement be explained 
(away) as a ‘mere construction’ that is either purely social and discursive, or material and 
technological. The coming-into-matter of an experimental fact or entity cannot be 
explained as a mere effect of the practices that make it present, but it too requires the 
careful production of delicate contacts and marvelous adjustments with the world brought 
about by the mutual negotiations and coming-to-terms between experimental practices 
and the obligations posed by experimental objects. Pickering successfully captures the 
process in what he has termed the “dance of agency”: 
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] [t]he dance of agency, seen asymmetrically from the human end, thus 
takes the form of a dialectic of resistance and accommodation, where resistance denotes 
the failure to achieve an intended capture of agency [of an entity] in practice, and 
accommodation an active human strategy of response to resistance, which can include 
revisions to goals and intentions as well as to the material form of the machine in 
question and to the human frame of gestures and social relations that surround it. (22) 
[END BLOCKQUOTE] 
 
Indeed, the ‘dance of agency’ may be said to characterize the relationship between the 
mode of invention of experimental practices and the recalcitrant mode of existence of 
experimental objects. Unlike other scientific objects, as we shall see, the mode of 
existence of experimental objects renders them particularly capable of making their own 
obligations present, of resisting irrelevant questions that may be posed to them by the 
experimental apparatus, and thus, of “turn[ing] around the (im)precisions of our foresight 
and understanding” (Rheinberger 23). For this reason, whenever an experiment succeeds 
in bringing an entity into being, the latter is capable of coming to matter in a way “that 
affirms [its] independence with respect to the time frame of human knowledge” 
(Stengers, Cosmopolitics 21).  
 
In other words, the mode of existence of certain experimental objects prevents them from 
going silent in relation to the way in which a practical process of knowing inherits them. 
However, when it comes to the question of how humans and other societies endowed 
Author’s Proof.  
17 
 
with higher organizational complexity are engaged through material-semiotic practices, 
the mode of relationality that characterizes an experimental practice cannot simply be 
extended by analogy. Rather, the relational proposition needs to be posed as a question to 
which practices of social inquiry must find their own way of responding. 
 
For, as Oliveira notes in his meditations, unlike the recalcitrant nature of experimental 
entities the old man does go silent and, according to him, so have Poe, Verlaine, and 
other “men like them” (Cortázar 98). By contrast to experimental entities, those societies 
we can associate with the matters of concern of the social sciences – those that could be 
said, following Whitehead, to be “personal societies”2 (Adventures of Ideas 205-206) – 
are generally not indifferent to the questions that are posed to them or the assumptions 
made about them. On the contrary, their mode of existence makes them capable of 
becoming interested in those questions, of being affected by them, of wondering what it 
is that the one posing the question may want from them, thus engaging in a way that 
actively incorporates such questions and assumptions (Stengers, Invention 146). 
 
Indeed, if the entities with which the social sciences are concerned may be capable, in the 
name of Science, of accepting the questions that are posed to them to the point of 
remaining silent about the assumptions such questions make, then, crucially, the kind of 
delicate contacts and marvelous adjustments that are required cannot merely be regarded 
as an extension of the modalities of mattering that characterize the experimental sciences. 
To do so would be to disregard the specific mode of mattering of such societies and thus 
to fail to make their specific obligations matter in the ongoing process of becoming that 
constitutes an inquiry. Nevertheless, this is precisely what many habitual forms of 
modern social research involve, namely, a submission of the object to their own practical 
demands; to their own questions, assumptions, theories; to their own way of framing the 
problem, regardless of whether that framing succeeds in coming to terms with how those 




My contention, is that from the point of view of an ethics of worlding, such habits are 
rather catastrophic. If what is at stake is a concern with how the obligations of the actual 
world are inherited by (social) scientific practices so that the onto-epistemic emergences 
and transformations they enact might contribute to the crafting of worldly forms of 
problematic togetherness; the modern habits of knowing of the social sciences whereby 
only one part of the world has the right to makes demands upon the other and expects the 
latter to submit to those demands, whereby only one part asks the questions and the other 
is expected to respond, entail rather disastrous consequences for the differential becoming 
of the world. For they fundamentally presuppose that scientific practices are obligated by 
nothing – that they can triumph blindly – and that, on the contrary, they are the ones with 
the right to obligate. 
  
In contrast, what the attention to the specific modes of mattering of personal societies 
makes felt, what it might be capable of teaching us, is that the success of a social 
scientific invention constitutes a particularly fragile achievement, and that the challenge 
of achieving a coming-to-terms, a stretching of a hand in a manner that may be able to 
“find response in another hand stretched out from the beyond, from the other part” 
(Cortázar 99), constitutes the very risk such practices have to face. Indeed, the task is not 
that of knowing in advance how to pose the right questions, but of devising a coming-to-
terms with the objects that a practice encounters such that they may object to the 
assumptions that are made about them, such that they may transform the ways in which a 
practice addresses them, and reshape, from their own point of view, the questions that are 
posed to them, so that the specificity of their mode of mattering may be felt.3 It is a 
question of immanently tuning semiotic-material practices to encounters with recalcitrant 
subjects that may themselves become vectors of risk (Savransky, “Recalcitrant 
Subjects”). 
 
In light of this, we may ask, how should we come to terms with, and become responsive 
to, the scene witnessed by Oliveira without defacing the old man’s experience, without 
forcing him to become silent, to submit to the assumptions that are made about him. How 
may we partake in a process of knowing which in its own mode of becoming may include 
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a reference to the mode of mattering of those it has to invent a way of inheriting? To be 
sure, as the questions themselves suggest, such interrogations can hardly be addressed in 
the abstract mode of a once-for-all response that would attempt to settle the concern of a 
worldly ethics by guaranteeing, procedurally, what the ‘right thing to do’ might be. After 
all, as Barad argues: “[e]thics is […] not about [the] right response to a radically 
exterior/ized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities 
of becoming of which we are a part” (Meeting 393). In contrast to the usual normative 
ethical guidelines, an ethics of worlding requires an immanent, practical, and situated 
mode of relating. As James reminds us, “the highest ethical life – however few may be 
called to bear its burdens – consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown 
too narrow for the actual case” (209). For this reason, I believe, such ethical concerns 
might allow us to reconsider the question and relevance of immanent and risky forms of 
relationality beyond the limitations of what I have associated with the ‘danger of 
relationalism’.  
 
Indeed, as I have argued, whenever societies of actual entities are concerned, the 
assertion that “relata do not preexist their relations” becomes dangerous, as it poses the 
danger of failing to recognize that, whenever it is a matter of coming to terms with 
another, the specific mode of mattering of an entity constitutes a constraint for the kind of 
relations we may find ourselves in. Societies have adventures and are therefore not only 
capable of being affected by the relations into which they enter, but also of affecting the 
nature of those relations. Thus, the ethico-onto-epistemological concerns that all 
processes of mattering raise involve the risk of having to invent a manner of attending to 
the obligations that the many relating entities – human and non-human – may pose to the 
on-going process of becoming. It concerns the risk of producing delicate contacts and 
marvelous adjustments with societies as they come to matter for a particular process of 
worldly reconfiguration. 
 
The endurance of societies does not at all imply that relationality is irrelevant, or that we 
should turn our attentions away from the very entanglements that constitute a society’s 
adventures – quite the opposite is the case. As Mariam Motamedi-Fraser has argued, in 
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relation to attending to social research methods as specific apparatuses for the ethico-
onto-epistemological becoming with of the social scientist, the materials with which she 
works, the objects of research, and the milieu that sustains the encounter and which the 
latter in turn affects, the task is to become 
 
[BLOCKQUOTE] singularly cognizant of, and alive to, the ontological, epistemological 
and ethical implications of different uses of different methodologies and methods and the 
role they play in enabling alternative, imaginative, patterns of relationality – patterns, that 
is, of experience. Herein lies the usefulness […] of the concept of relationality in 
research: it necessarily invites questions about the kinds of relations we are in or, indeed, 
the kinds of relations we could be in, and what specific arrangements of relations do or do 
not allow. (102) [END BLOCKQUOTE] 
 
Thus, attending to the mannerism of societies and relationalities requires not just an 
affirmation of relationality as what may enact the on-going transformation of reality, but 
also a demanding, yet productive, care for the textures and patterns of the many 
modalities of relating that may become available in the coming-to-terms that 
characterizes an encounter; a care for the manner in which specific beings, practices, 
methodologies, and relations come to negotiate the nature of their multiply constrained 
entanglements, their modes of co-existence, and the consequences that such negotiations 
may involve for the progressive differentiation of the world.  
 
Conclusion: Caring for What Matters 
 
By speculatively inhabiting the scene witnessed by Oliveira while wandering through the 
streets of Paris, in this article I have attempted to think, among others, with Barad, 
Whitehead, and Oliveira himself about the sort of challenge that an ethics of worlding 
might involve for any process of becoming that may be concerned with what, in 
accordance with Whitehead, I have referred to as a ‘society’. After discussing the 
limitations of what I have here termed ‘the danger of relationalism’, I have argued that 
whenever societies are at stake, an ethics of worlding has to include, as an immanent 
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concern, the question of how practices inherit the specific modes of mattering of the 
entities with which they are entangled, in such a way that the obligations that the societies 
of such a world may be felt. The raising of this question, which ultimately involves the 
careful crafting of delicate contacts and marvelous adjustments with the world, 
constitutes the very risk that practical processes of knowing have to face if they are to 
avoid triumphing blindly and enacting a ‘double loneliness’ that disjoins the world. 
 
Moreover, I have argued that what defines a society is not just the fact of the grouping of 
the many actual entities of which it consists, but the dynamic mode of their (be)coming 
together. Thus, attending to societies of actual entities necessarily invites a concern for 
their various modes of mattering. Such a concern becomes crucial when thinking about 
scientific practices, for it is precisely in the encounter between the specific mode of 
existence of a society and the specific mode of coming-to-terms of a practice that the risk 
of responsibility emerges. Thus, far from taking our attention and imagination away from 
the entangled relationalities through which various worldly entities, human and non-
human, emerge, become and enter into new entanglements, the mannerism of thought that 
I have proposed invites us to pay due attention to the kind of relations we are in, and the 
possibilities certain patterns of relationality may enable, or, instead, inhibit. The 
challenge of engaging knowledge-practices through an ethics of worlding might perhaps 
be conceived not only as a matter of accountability for what emerges from an 
indeterminate process of materialization but also, and crucially, as the risk of becoming 
sensitive to the modes in which our practices of knowing, with their specific patterns of 
relationality, may come to terms with what Whitehead expressed as “our primary 
experience” of the world: “Have a care, here is something that matters!” (Modes of 
Thought 116). 
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1 In fact, the historical and philosophical connections between the early developments in quantum physics 
and Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism are multiple and well documented (see for instance 
Epperson). 
 
2 A personal society is a society the realized nexus of which is “purely temporal and continuous” 
(Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas 205). Thus, while a human may, in a sense, be a ‘person’, we should resist 
the temptation to associate personality with humanity. As Whitehead cogently puts it: “Each living body is 
 
2 A personal society is a soci ty the realized nexus of which is “purely temporal and continuous” 
(Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas 205). Thus, while a human may, in a sense, be a ‘person’, we should resist 
the temptation to associate personality with humanity. As Whitehead cogently puts it: “Each living body is 
a society, which is not [necessarily] personal. But most of the animals, including all the vertebrates, seem to 
have their social system dominated by a subordinate society which is ‘personal’. This subordinate society is 
of the same type as ‘man’ [...] Thus in a sense a dog is a ‘person’, and in another sense he is a non-personal 
society.” (205-206). For interesting discussions on encounters with non-human animals see for instance 
Haraway, and for an examination of living, yet possibly non-personal societies, see Hayward. 
 
3 To be sure, an invitation to object shall not be confused with a mere call for more democratic and 
participatory forms of knowledge-production. As I hope to have shown, what is at stake is not whether 
scientific objects are engaged in the process of becoming that knowledge-practices contribute to enacting, 
but the manner of their engagement. An invitation to ‘participate’ in the name of Science, for example, 
does not guarantee a worldly encounter, and will not prevent the world from becoming disjunct.  
